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Scientific research, externalities and  
economic growth 
Maria Rosaria Carillo





Study of the causes of economic growth since the industrial revolution has 
highlighted the importance of technological development. This interpretation of 
long-period growth has come to the fore in the applied literature, and recently also in 
the theoretical literature which reprises Schumpeter’s theories of the first half of the 
1900s. On closer inspection, however, this interpretation is incomplete because it 
fails to consider the origin of technological advancement, namely the progress of 
science. Historians and scholars of science, in fact, stress the concomitance between 
the appearance of important scientific discoveries and the transition from a period of 
slow productivity growth to that of exponential expansion which led up to the 
contemporary age. 
The alliance between basic research, technology and growth has been 
particularly close and fruitful since the nineteenth century. Rosenberg and Birdzell 
(1986; 1990) argue that economic miracle of the Western world can be explained by 
the marked increase in science’s ability to investigate the secrets of nature since the 
end of the 1800s. This greater efficiency of basic research was initially due to 
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important changes in its organization and closer interaction with the rest of society 
and with the economy.  
In this chapter we put forward an analytical approach to economic growth 
which tries to capture the essential features of the interaction between the work of the 
scientific community and long-period economic activity. 
The traditional theory of growth, which originated with Solow (1956), 
considers the academic world to be exogenous with respect to the economy. As in the 
case of other public goods, the production of knowledge is the task of the state. 
Exceptions in this theoretical tradition are the works of Karl Shell (1969, 1970), in 
which the production of knowledge is endogenous. In this model, the state collects 
resources from the activities of private agents in order to finance basic research, 
which is the public input to the private sector. The economic problem analysed by 
Shell is essentially that of the dynamic allocation of resources between the 
production of goods and the production of knowledge.  
Still largely unexplored in the economics literature is the scientific research 
sector in relation to its forms of organization and the incentives - economic and 
otherwise - which motivate those who work in it. 
With the advent of ‘endogenous growth theory’ - the new scientific paradigm 
for the analysis of growth - innovation has become a central topic of inquiry.  The 
works of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) have generated a rich Schumpeterian strand in growth theory which draws 
heavily on the microeconomic literature on industrial innovation in which innovative 
firms get a patent that prevents others from profiting from new knowledge. These 
models, too, relegate the production of new opportunities for technological progress 
to a residual domain exogenous to the economy. The case of growth models with   4
general purpose technology is emblematic of the limitations of this approach. GPTs, 
in fact, are radical changes in technologies which improve production possibilities in 
a wide range of sectors. These changes should certainly be associated with scientific 
advances which alter the constraints to which technologies are subject, but there is no 
trace of this phenomenon in these models. 
The model analysed in this paper represents the working of an economy 
which consists of agents who may choose to work either in the goods production 
sector or in scientific research. These two economic activities are organized 
according to different objectives and rules. Research is financed by the state out of 
taxes, and its output is a public good that benefits all firms and improves their 
productivity. Researchers are engaged in competitions with other researchers for a 
new discovery. The probability of a new finding by a researcher is a function of 
his/her effort, and his/her interactions with other researchers.  
(Bisogna continuare con la descrizione) 
Among the main results of the model are  ….(Si dovrebbero inserire I 
risultati, ma quali sono?) 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section surveys the theoretical 
literature on the relationship between science and economic growth. The third 
section sets out the basic theoretical model. The fourth section analyses the model’s 
equilibrium solution. 
 
2.  The related literature 
Arrow’s 1962 essay laid the basis for the economic analysis of the production 
of and the demand for knowledge; analysis that was subsequently developed with   5
reference to technological innovation. In the very general terms of Arrow’s analysis, 
the various forms that knowledge can assume are likened to information. According 
to Arrow, on the supply side, once knowledge has been produced it can be 
transmitted at a cost considerably lower than that necessary for its production. On the 
demand side, information has the characteristic of non-rivalry in its consumption, 
because its use by one individual does not reduce the quantity available for 
consumption by another individual. These two features of knowledge make it similar 
to a public good - all the more so the greater the degree of excludability in 
consumption, which cannot be perfect. 
Arrow’s article prompted Dasgupta and David (1987) to investigate the 
fundamental differences between the production of knowledge in the institutions of 
science and technology. This important essay laid the basis for the modern economic 
theory of science. The main differences between the worlds of science and 
technological innovation reside in their organization and the goals pursued. The 
fundamental difference between science and technology concerns the dissemination 
of results, which is immediate and complete in scientific research\ as academic 
researchers seek to publish their discoveries as soon as possible and obtain, through 
peer evaluation, recognition by the scientific community of the validity of their 
results. This is contrary to what happens in technological research where new 
knowledge is kept secret. 
The scientific community on the one hand enjoys the advantage of complete 
information; on the other, it is concerned to ensure the researcher’s property right on 
the item of new knowledge that s/he has produced. Because full disclosure is the 
optimal solution from the point of view of society’s well-being, this social norm 
adopted in the scientific community serves that purpose. Obviously, full disclosure   6
conflicts strongly with the secrecy necessary to be able to profit from technological 
innovation. Firms, in fact, obtain a return on investments in R\&D in relation to the 
degree of market power that a patent or the restricted circulation of an innovation 
may generate for them.  
Radically different from this objective is the ‘quest for priority’ in attribution 
of the paternity of a discovery that motivates academic researchers. The latter 
immediately submit the results of their work for publication which will certify their 
priority in the discovery. From this derives recognition in monetary terms (career 
advancement, awards, etc.) and in terms of reputation and prestige in the scientific 
community. 
The incentives system that operates in research is characterized by great 
uncertainty and by the principal’s difficulty of monitoring effort. The evolution of 
state-organized academic research seems to have struck a balance between the 
private motivations of researchers and the needs of society.  Individual scientists take 
part in contests in which those who obtain an innovative result first receive 
recognition from the scientific community and the advantages that ensure therefrom. 
Because the work of those who do not win is valueless, the contest belongs to the 
category of tournaments in which the winner takes all (Dasgupta, 1989; Lazear, 
1997).  
Comparison with reality shows that this system efficiently incentivizes 
academic researchers, in that they are generally highly motivated and committed to 
their research. In effect, this result also derives from the assurance of an income, 
often from teaching duties, which mitigates the effects of the risk in research. 
The rules of the academic world favour the spread of forms of collaboration 
and information-sharing which have important externalities. Work in academic   7
departments is characterized by forms of knowledge sharing and ideas’ discussion as 
seminars and mimeo circulation and also by several informal ways of externalities in 
everyday life interactions. The transmission of tacit knowledge takes place in 
academic departments whose composition is an important factor in the work of 
individual researchers. This relationship may also hold among researchers belonging 
to different institutions but who work in the same field and interact with each other to 
form ‘invisible colleges’ (David, 1998). Furthermore, scientific work is often carried 
out by teams of researchers, in that the advantages deriving from obtaining priority 
are generally indivisible, while the pooling of kindred and specialized skills 
considerably increases the chances of success (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Data on 
publications show that collaborations have increased over time. 
Externalities in knowledge production have been analyzed by Carraro and 
Siniscalco (2001) in a model that concerns a race between academic researchers and 
researchers in private firms to a specific discovery with possible commercial use. 
This paper shows under what conditions the coexistence of Science and Technology 
institutions can be welfare maximizing. 
Finally there are a number of papers that have tried to measure empirically 
the influence of scientific advances on technological innovation and on productivity 
of economic systems. The influence of scientific advances on technological 
innovation, and on the productivity of economic systems, has been the subject of 
applied inquiry for a number of years. The studies by Mansfield (1991, 1995) are 
based on surveys of firms’ opinions on the importance of scientific advances for 
innovation in products and processes. The first study was based on a sample of 76 of 
the largest USA firms and found that in the period 1975-1985 around 11\% of new   8
products and 9\% of new processes could not have been developed without the 
results of academic research conducted in the previous fifteen years. 
An equally direct approach has been used by Adams (1990), who estimates 
the contribution of scientific knowledge to productivity growth in 18 manufacturing 
sectors. The main feature of this study is its meticulous construction of an indicator 
of the stock of scientific knowledge obtained by considering both the number of 
publications in scientific fields closest to the sector’s technology since the 1930s, and 
the scientific personnel employed in the sector. 
Another strand of studies consider the spatial effects of research spillover on 
the innovative activities of firms. Among the most important of these studies is Jaffe 
(1989), which considers data on corporate patents in each state of the USA. The 
estimation of a model of simultaneous equations shows that there are important 
spillover values for academic research, especially in the cases of pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals industries.  
3. The  Economy 
A class of growth models that can be used to represent the salient features of the 
science sector described in the previous sections comprises so-called neo-
Schumpeterian models. Here we follow the framework of Aghion-Howitt (1992) in 
which there is no capital accumulation. 
In our economy there is a continuum of individuals, of measure 1, who can 
find employment in one of two different sectors: one is a competitive consumption 
good sector, the other is the basic research sector which produces the body of 
knowledge used in the production process of the final good. Manufacturing firms are 
owned by all agents in the economy, and labour and capital markets are perfecly   9
competitive. The state owns and organizes the science sector.  Time is indexed by t, 
while the state of knowledge is indexed by k. 
The consumption good, which acts as numeraire, is produced using the 
following technology: 
α α − =
1 Z l R Y kt k kt     (1)   
with  1 0 < <α , where  kt l  denotes the number of specialised workers used at time t, 
k R  is a technological parameter which measures the productivity of the basic 
knowledge freely disposable in the technological era k, and Z is an input available 
with fixed supply, that in the following we normalize to 1. 
In this economy, innnovation consists in the birth of a new body of 
knowledge, k+1, produced in the science sector, able to increase the productivity of 
final good workers by a constant parameter  1 > γ . That is to say, as common in 
Shumpeterian growth models, we assume that: 
k
k R γ =       ( 2 )  
Consequently k denotes the type of basic knowledge and the technological era that 
comes to an end with a scientific discovery and the introduction in manufacturing of 
an innovation. Because the parameters that define the economy, and therefore the 
choices made by the agents, remain constant during each technological era, 
henceforth we can simplify the notation by omitting the time index t when it is not 
indispensable. 
Each individual has an infinite life-span and is characterised by one (identical 
for all agents) intertemporal utility function of consumption and effort required by 
the job performed. We assume the following instantaneous utility function for 
scientists:   10
kt kt kt
R
kt R dx c u
σ + − =
1      (3)   
with  1 0 < <σ , where c is consumption and x is effort on the job. As a matter of fact, 
scientists make research essentially applying cognitive resources and effort whose  
disutility of effort depends also on the extent of knowledge that must be mastered on 
the job. 
While, to simplify algebra, we assume that workers in manufacturing derive utility 
from consumption only: 
  kt
y
kt c u =  
The intertemporal preference rate, r, is constant and in equilibrium coincides with the 
rate of interest at which firms collect savings. 
 
3.1. Science  sector 
Science sector in this economy produces the new basic knowledge which is a public 
good freely disposible for the production of the final good. As is well known, public 
good production usually involves strong problems with workers’ incentives and 
effort. In our model, this issue is crucial since new knowledge production - hence 
economic growth - depends on effort of scientists. 
The main characteristic of the academia is the high value attached to the 
priority of discovery. As a consequence of the norm of “priority” in scientific 
discoveries researchers compete in contests to be the first who introduces an 
innovation, and be rewarded by the scientific community. In this “winner take all” 
contest the prize consists in a monetary reward,  1 + k m  that is funded by the State and 
will last untill a new innovation and a new tchnological era arrive.   11
In this model innovation is uncertain and, following the literature on patent 
races, we assume that the probability that a single researcher obtains an innovation 
depends on the effort that he devotes to the research actitivity, and follows a Poisson 
stocastic process with arrival rate given by: 
() k k k x h x x θ θ θ + =     (4)   
where  k x  is the effort employed by the scientist in the research activity,  k x  is the 
average effort of the research sector, and θ  and h are two positive parameters. 
While, as concerns the probability that an innovation occurs in the economy, we 
have:  
   ) ( k k k x h x n + θ     (4.a)        
The role of colleagues is of a paramount importance in doing science. In fact, 
good science is done in communities of scientists where cooperation between 
colleagues is very strong. Scientists talk with other scientists, share ideas, discuss one 
another work. This occur in informal way and in formal presentations of seminars 
and papers. The interchanges that result from such discussions can make spectacular 
differences in science.  
The importance of the group is enhanced also by the rules which govern the 
academia, in fact the rule of priority induces to exchange ideas in order to obtain as 
early as possible the recognition of others, in other words, it works the rule of “full 
disclosure” (Dasgupta and David, 1994) that increases the interconnections among 
researchers and the externalities effects. 
To capture such important aspects we have assumed that the productivity of a 
single researcher depends not only upon his own effort but also upon the effort put in 
the research activity by his colleagues, rapresented by the average effort of the   12
scientists group. We use the average effort since it better represents the intellectual 
and psychological resources of others to which scientist may have access, which are 
relevant not only for their quantity but rather for their quality. 
Given the above hypotheses the total expected benefits deriving from being 
an innovator are: 
()
() [] () dt m e x h x V k t





0 1 1 1
+
∞ − + + −
+ ∫
+ + + + =
θ θ    (5)   
Substituting this expression in equations (3), (4) and (4.a), and solving the integral, 
we obtain: 
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k x h x n r
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Hence, the total expected benefits deriving from partecipate in the research sector is 
given by the following: 
() [] () [ ]dt dx R V e U k k k t
t t x h x n r
k
R k k k σ θ +
+




0    (7) 
 
3.2.  The consumption good sector 
In the consumption good sector each worker can supply inelastically one unit of 
labour factor, and there is no disutility connected with work. The expected utility 
obtainable by workers in this sector is: 
() [] ()dt w e U k t
t t x h x n r
k
y k k k ∫
∞ − + + − =
0
0 θ      (8)   
where  k w  is the wage obtainable in that sector. 
Consumption sector receives technology from the research sector at no cost, 
but it pays taxes that the state uses to fund the research sector. Considering the   13
production function (1) and bearing in mind that this sector operates in perfect 
competition, profits net of taxes are defined as follows:  
  () r l w Y k k k − − − = τ π 1 
where τ  denotes the tax rate. Maximization of this function yields the wages in the 




α α τ k k k l R w        ( 9 )  
3.3.  The public sector 
The state levies taxes,  Y τ  on the consumption good sector in order to finance 
production of knowledge by the research sector. 
k k Y m τ = .         ( 1 0 )  
 
4. Equilibrium 
Equilibrium in this economy is defined by both the optimal level of effort that each 
scientist puts in the research acitvity and in the optimal number of scientists that are 
allocated to the science sector. 
The optimal level of effort undertaken by scientists,  k x , maximizes the 
present net value of the total expected benefits deriving from doing research. We 
assume that a scientist does not have a strategic behaviour so that she does not 
consider the effect of her effort on the arrival rate of discoveries in the economy. In 
this case, the maximization of the total benefits gives rise to the following first order 
equilibrium condition: 
() () 0 1
1 1 1
1 = + −






k x R d
x h x n r
m
    (11)     14
According to equation (11), each researcher chooses the optimal amount of 
effort by equating the expected discounted marginal benefit of one more unit of 
effort to the marginal disutility that derives from effort. The optimal choice of effort 
depends positively on the prize for a discovery and negatively on the likelihood that 
a new finding will sign the end of the period during which he is the winner of the 
race, hence, it depends on how many resources (scientists and effort) the economy 
will put on research in the next knowledge era k+1.  
Since individuals can choose, without sustaining costs, to participate in the 
labour market either as workers in the consumption sector or as researchers in the 
science sector, in equilibrium the maximum utility yielded by the two types of 
activity should be the same. By equations (9) and (10) we have the following 
equilibrium condition for the labour market: 




1        ( 1 2 )    
where effort in research is the optimal value that derives from equation (11). 
Given that individuals are homogeneous, equilibrium will be simmetric, 
which implies that  k k x x = . Finally, in equilibrium all individuals find employment, 
then we have: 
1 = + k k l n         ( 1 3 )  
 
4.1. Dynamics 
The analysis of general equilibrium dynamics can be summarized by the last three 
equilibrium conditions. After substitution of equations (11) and (13) in equation (12) 
we obtain the following difference equation in the variable  k n  in the domain (0, 1):   15
()( ) k k n n Ω = Ψ +1        ( 1 4 )  
where 
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1 1 D dD n n k k  (16) 
As in Aghion and Howitt’s model, equation (14) enables us to determine the 
amount of labour employed in the science sector in era k as function of the labour 
employed in the successive technological era. In fact, we are able to characterize the 
functions  () 1 + Ψ k n  and  () k n Ω . 
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we know that  ( ) k n Ω  is monotone increasing and  ( ) 1 + Ψ k n  is monotone decreasing. 
Furthermore,    16
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1 D dD . 
Hence, an intersection between the functions exists if   ( ) ( ) 0 0 Ω > Ψ . In this case, we 
can apply the implicit function theorem and define the difference equation that 
describes the economy dynamics: 














The study of  equilibrium dynamics can proceed as in Aghion and Howitt, 
(1992). We assume agents have perfect foresight, hence the economy employment of 
scientists at each era k is determined according to the forecast of the future 
employment  1 + k n . Equilibrium dynamics are defined by sequences of scientists 
employment that start from the value  0 n  and go into the future, and satisfy the 
difference function  () 1 + Γ = k k n n . 
A steady state equilibrium is defined as a value of  n such that  () n n Γ = .  
Monotonicity properties of the functions  ( ) n Ψ  and  ( ) n Ω  - see figure 1 - ensure that 
there exists a unique stationary solution to equation (17). This steady state n  is 
asymptotically stable if : 
() () 0 < Ω + Ψ n n n n          ( 1 8 )  
In this case, there are cycles of  k n  that converge towards the steady state n . 
Otherwise, when inequality (18) is reversed, two different kinds of dynamic 
equilibrium may exist: one in which employment in basic research converges to a   17
stable two-cycle where it assumes alternatively a low and a high value; another 
equilibrium in which a stable two-cycle is made by a nil value of employment. This 
interesting case defines a “no-growth trap” (see Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and 
happens when the economy converges to an equilibrium in which a high forecast of 
future employment in research determines a nil value today, that will remain the 
equilibrium outcome of the model dynamics in any time period. Inspection of figure 
1 reveals that a no-growth trap may exist when both  ( ) 0 Ψ  and  () 0 Ω  are high 
because in this case the equilibrium cycle can be made by an high foreseen value of 
research employment to which corresponds a nil value of   k n .  
Interestingly enough, such a dynamic equilibrium is more likely when the 
parameter h is high
1, hence static externalities in the scientific sector may cause nil 
investment in basic research. Actually, social interactions are an important feature of 
modern systems of scientific research in the industrialized world. Our result says that 
this phenomenon could be responsible for the evidence concerning many countries – 
not only the very poor – that choose to remain outside the international scientific 
community. 
After convergence to a dynamic equilibrium, the economy evolves along a 
balanced growth path. Given the distribution of employment between science and 
good production, effort in basic research is determined by the equilibrium conditions 
equations (11) and (12). Then the rest of endogenous variables derives from general 
equilibrium of markets.  
Even if our analysis of equilibrium dynamics focuses on employment, a 
similar study can be performed with reference to effort. In fact, equations (11), (12) 
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and (13) can be manipulated to derive a difference equation in effort only. After 
these steps we are able to derive the equation: 
() ( ) k
x
k
x x x Ω = Ψ +1 ,         ( 1 9 )  
where: 




















































x ;  (20) 
and 
  () ( ) [] d D x x k k
x + − ≡ Ω α τ
σ 1 .        ( 2 1 )  
In figure 2 we represent the two functions. It is straightforward to verify that 
() k
x x Ω  is concave increasing starting from the origin. We can prove that  () 1 + Ψ k
x x  
is monotone decreasing, and  

















x x   
with  . 0 > x  Hence, equilibrium values of effort always exists, and we can define a 
difference equation that slopes downward and summarises the equilibrium dynamics 
of effort: 
  () 1 + Γ = k
x
k x x          ( 2 2 )  
Concerning this function some comments can be drawn similar to those that 
apply to the dynamics of employment  k n . In this case too, a stationary equilibrium 
exists that can be stable, and equilibrium cycles of effort should be associated with 
cycles of  k n . However, inspection of figure 2 allows us to rule out the possible 
existence of a no-growth trap in equilibrium effort dynamics. This result should   19
mean that when foreseen employment in basic research in period  1 + k  deters any 
positive investment in research today, effort could assume any non-negative value. 
Hence, this feature of our model makes more realistic the definition of a no-growth 
trap.  
In the following sections we will analyse the properties of equilibrium 
focusing on the stable steady state.  
 
4.2. Comparative statics and balanced growth 
In order to derive the effects of some relevant parameters on the steady state value of 
scientist employment, we concentrate on the case of a single steady state and we 
assume that it is stable. After some algebra we are able to state the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1.  
a) Let us consider n , the stable steady state of the equation  () 1 + Γ = k k n n,  t h e n :  
•  n increases when τ  increases if  τ τ − <1 ; 
•  n increases when h or γ  increase; 
•  n decreases with the interest rate r. 
b) Let us consider x , the stable steady state of the equation  () 1 + Γ = k k x x,  t h e n :  
•  x increases with an increase of  γ ; 
•  x  decreases with an increase of h or r; 
•  x  has an ambiguous behaviour when τ  increases. 
Proof in Appendix. 
   20
Some interesting comments can be done on the statements of this proposition.  Public 
policies aimed at the enlargement of the science sector can be realized by collecting 
more resources from the private sector that will be channelled to higher prizes for 
scientific discoveries. This kind of policy improves the reward of doing basic 
research. Strong effects on the size of science sector may derive from the strength of 
externalities in scientific environments. In fact, cooperative and collaborative 
departments may provide an incentive to joining the world of science. This effect 
accords with both common sense and a large part of sociological literature dealing 
with science. 
Interesting results derive also from comparative statics of equilibrium effort 
of researchers. In fact, both the negative effects of externalities and the ambiguous 
effect of state resources seems to be counterintuitive. The ambiguous effect of state 
resources can be explained by considering that  when state resources increase there 
are three effects: there is an increase in the resources devoted to the prize derived 
from an innovation, which rises the effort, but there is also an increase in the size of 
research sector which increases the probability that an innovation occurs in the 
economy, reducing in this way the duration of the prize; finally an increase in state 
resources reduces the wage obtainable in the alternative sector and, given the labour 
market equilibrium condition, this reduces also the reward of all the specialised 
workers and consequently their level of effort.  Regard to the negative effect of 
externalities this can be explained by similar considerations. In this case we have two 
opposite effects, on one hand an increase in externalities increases the probability 
that a researcher obtains an innovation, but on the other there is an increase in the 
probability that an innovation occurs in the economy, which reduces the duration of 
the prize. This latter effect  is greater  since it is magnified by the size of research 
sector.      21
The opposite effects of externalities on size and effort in science sector 
provide us with an important motivation for the separate introduction of effort in our 
model. This effect reminds us that there are limits to collaborative behaviour that 
should consider the individual incentive to work in science. 
In our economy, production of the final good increases only when an 
innovation occurs, and this is a probabilistic event. The expected average steady state 
rate of growth of per capita income depends on the number of researches employed 
in science, on the productivity of these workers, on the optimal level of effort and on 
the magnitude of the technological advance brought about by the innovation. In 
particular we consider the determinants of balanced growth characterized by the 
steady state values of scientists employment and effort n , x : 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) γ τ γ τ γ θ ln 1 , , , , ln ln 1 h h x h n Y Y E g E t t + = − = −    (23) 
 
Taking into account comparative statics results of Proposition 1 , we are able to write 
the following  
Proposition 2. In balanced growth equilibrium the expected rate of growth of per 
capita income increases with an increase of each of the parameters τ , γ . The sign 
of the  effect of the importance of externalities in research - h - is undetermined.  
Proof: it is trivial from Proposition1. 
This proposition gives us a picture that highlights the role that science sector may 
have in economic growth. It also summarises some important results of the paper. 
In this model two forces drive the production of new knowledge and economic 
gowth. One is individual choice of scientists who take part of a complex organization 
in which incentives derive not only from money income but also from the 
community rules. The other is the collective choice made by all agents from wich the   22
relative size of science sector derives. The monetary incentive to work in basic 
research has both an individual and an aggregate dimensions, since the second 
concerns the distribution of physical resources between the two sectors of the 
economy. 
Externalities of average effort of scientists affect the individual probability of 
obtaining a new finding and represent the third context effect in science sector. As 
usual, externalities in production lower the individual incentive to effort, but cause 
increasing returns on aggregate activities.  This seems to happen also in our model 
and the result of externalities on growth depends on the relative strenght of these two 
contrasting effects. 
5. Conclusions  
This paper represents the first attempt to the modelling of basic research and long run 
economic growth since work done by Karl Shell in the late sixties. As common in the 
framework of endogenous growth models, we provide a formalization of the 
interactions between the scientific sector and the rest of the economy which work 
both ways. Focus is on the role of externalities in basic research that affect the 
probability of success of each scientist racing for a new finding. The state organizes 
production of new knowledge - a public good - with resources taken from the private 
sector. 
Scientists compete each other to get a priority over a discovery and these races are 
affected by several forms of social interactions. In fact, scientists informal 
interactions give rise to externalities that hasten discoveries. Given that science is 
financed by taxes taken from private firms, output growth and structure of basic 
research activity jointly determine the dynamics of the economy. This dynamics are   23
not trivial as multiple steady state equilibria can derive from strong effects of social 
inteactions in science. 
Here we set the main lines for the analysis of such an important issue for long run 
growth that in future work we will further develop in order to deal with welfare 
issues and public policy. 
Appendix 
A1. Properties of the function  ( ) 1 + Ψ k
x x . 
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We can write  ( ) 1 + Ψ k
x x  as: 
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This version of the function shows the denominator that is zero when the increasing 














1 θ α α
α
. It can 
be easily seen that this intersection always happens for a positive value of  1 + k x , 
hence we can state that:   24
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A2. Proof of Proposition 1. 
Part a). Starting from  () ( ) n n Ω = Ψ  we can write: 
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n n D h n r . 
Taking the differential of that equation with respect to n  and τ  we get: 
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As far as the effect of externalities on scientist employment is concerned, equation 
(a1) can be rearranged in the following way:   25






































Part b).  
At the steady state the equation  ( ) ( ) k
x
k
x x x Ω = Ψ +1  can be written as: 
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   (a2) 
Differentiation of (a2) with respect to x  and τ  provides: 
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Figure 2. The existence of equilibrium dynamics of effort in science sector. 
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